Does it really matter for the thought experiment if N is simulated or not? You said yourself that alternatively we can consider N as a simulation in which simulators don´t bother to resurrect h. I just chose this version.
But even if we choose the version with one simulated and one non-simulated world, the information of the difference of both h is there, because it is our thought experiment and we know it. Call that “superobjective view” as well, but no matter what, it is a theory we need a mathematical model for. The same problem remains if we choose my version of two simulated worlds. If one h is resurrected and the other not, we need a description of this reality, whether the subjects or the simulator know this difference or not.
It seems so, but we know more. We all talked about the “i” although we can not explain, what it really is.
Good point. If we will one day be able to create strong AI it might be possible to reduce the “problem” of the “configuration of particles”. Here is another thought experiment: if mental states supervene on the configuration of particles in any human, mental states must supervene on the configuration of data the AI consists of. We can copy data without any loss or difference of any kind. (hopefully). If we create two AI with the same data, they would not know which copy they are, as well. But if we give each of them a body ( even if we give them two identical robot-bodies, they will not be identical as copied data will be identical, but let us assume we could built completely identical bodies) they will experience the necessity to occupy a different space. And this difference is enough, like an itch on the nose is, to change the mental states of both because their input of data (their experience of their surroundings and their bodies) varies. Like an itch on the nose or the occupation of a different space it seems to me that there is just little difference necessary to divide two identical persons into two different persons.
Another interesting problem comes with your statement that you are all of your copys. In your model h_S and h_N there is only one person until the specific point in time (t=75) when one simulator decides to resurrect h_S and the other decides to keep h_N dead, or as you prefer: a natural, non-simulated world will lead to death without resurrection afterwards. So the decision of the simulator S to resurrect h_S against the “decision” of the universe N, not to resurrect h_N rips a person, that is at first one and the same (function) apart and creates two.
Would you agree that the occupation of a different space is trigger enough for a bifurcation? If you agree, then my question would be why the completely different residence of h_S and h_N should not be enough. Another problem is: if h_N and h_S are the same until the age of 75, why should h_N not become h_S and live on ? Or if you consider my version of your model and we have two different simulators deciding the fate of one person will they experience a tug war over the fate of h ? And if S wins h is resurrected ?
So here are my remaining questions/problems:
- If no body knows (not the subject h, not the simulator S and no “superobjective view”) that there are two identical universes S and N are there really two ? Or will they automatically merge into one Universe U if they happen to be identical ? Or is it the other way round:
- Even if no body knows that there are two Universes N and S, the information is there, no matter if it is part of a brain or just implemented in the cosmos like a natural law. And the existing information of a difference forbids to call N and S identical.
- If two Simulators quarrel over the decision what to do with h after he dies at the age of 75, would h remain in a state like Schrödingers cat until the decision is made? And what is the consequence of a decision:
a) would h_N and h_S who are the same identical person h_U until the age of 75 split up into two persons h_N and h_S or is it the other way round:
b) and h_N and h_S merge into one of both, depending which Simulator wins the quarrel and decides the fate of h because:
- Your version is strange. You posit that there are two persons h_N and h_S, although h would never know. So you have the “superobjective view”. You posit a difference between them and at the same time you declare them identical. Wouldn´t that be the same if we suggest that one equals two? Back to 1. and 2.:
- If there are two identical Universes S and N but they occupy a different spacetime, or a different quantumreality, they are not the same. And if they occupy the same spacetime they merge into one. If one is simulated and the other is not it suffices to view them as not identical, even if they occupy the same spacetime. (if that is possible). Or is there another possibility?
Yes. Because we must occupy a different space, when we met those versions, otherwise there will be no different versions. This alone should suffice to have different mental states because we perceive our surroundings different.
Another interesting question is why we refer to a person as “I” that doesn´t share the same time. „Yesterday, I did x…“ is possible, because we perceive a continuation in time. But what makes our own version our „own“?